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This thesis discusses the incorporation of human
factors into combat models. First, an historical
perspective to determine the significant human factors of
combat reveals that human factors fall into two categories
based upon when they affect man the most: before/after the
battle, and during the battle. Next, combat models are
reviewed. Various purposes and model structures are
discussed. Finally, incorporating human factors into combat
models is discussed.
It is argued that the model and the human factors must
simultaneously be considered, for the selection of one
influences the selection of the other. The structure and
purpose of the model may limit which human factors can be
considered. Analysis of the model's sensitivity to human
factor representations will indicate which human factors
are significant in that model.
Furthermore, empirical data are lacking and not all
human factors are mathematically representable at the
current time. Some human factors, such as decision making,
may be included using artificial intelligence techniques
until data are obtained, if possible. When models and human
factors are combined, the model must still be usable and
understandable. The conclusion is that human factors should
be incorporated into combat models, step by step, as the
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War. Man has participated in war throughout his
existence here on this planet; from the Battle of Jericho
around 1200 B.C., to the recent war between the Soviet
backed Afghan army and the Afghan mudj ahadeen , or "freedom
fighters". In just the 2 0th century alone, there have been
more than 200 wars, 36 of these active at the end of 1986,
pitting five and a half million soldiers from one quarter
of the earths nations against each other (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, pg. ,xxvi) . It is
not surprising, then, that man has thought about war and
tried to understand it. Well known, early writings date
back to Sun Tzu's The Art of War , circa 400 B.C., and range
all the way to the present.
These writers have tried to understand the nature of
war and battle. One of the most influential writers of the
nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz, said that war was
a remarkable trinity
...composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity,
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of
the play of chance and probability within which the
creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of
subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes
it subject to reason alone. (Howard, pg. , 73)
He stated succinctly that " war is the trial of moral
(the will) and physical forces by means of the latter"
(Howard, pg. , 26) and he concluded that " moral factors,
then, were the ultimate determinants in war...."
(Howard, pg. ,29)
The importance of moral factors, or human factors as
they are commonly called today, was reaffirmed in the late
20th century when Dupuy and Hammerman (pg.,14) concluded
that "human factors were found to be the major
determinants of the outcome of battles fought during these
(the 1973 Arab-Israeli) wars."
One modern way of thinking about and trying to
understand war is exemplified in the methodology of
constructing and using combat simulations. In a combat
simulation the essence of combat is distilled and
specifically formulated as mathematical representations of
war and battle.
The methodology to distill this essence is one of
systematic study, where assumptions are made until a
mathematical relationship is established, and then an
iterative process of removing assumptions and rewriting the
relationships begins. This process continues until time,
money, or the ability to replace assumptions with data
prevent the process from continuing.
These representations are then written into computer
programs which allow modern man to simulate war or battle,
make changes to the model, re-run the simulation, and
observe and study the results. All these steps aid mans
pursuit of knowledge and the understanding of the
phenomenon of Clausewitz • "remarkable trinity."
There are many types of models and also many uses. One
common feature, though, is their paucity of human factor
representations. More realistic models would provide more
accurate results, and hence, better information for the
various decision makers that rely on models for input to
their decision making process.
However, accomplishing this goal of realistic models
reguires detailed understanding of combat simulations and
the significant human factors that affect combat.
Additionally, the representations of the salient human
factors must be based upon quantitative data that allow the
modeler to forego human factor assumptions and construct a
mathematical relationship. Combining these representations
of human factors is not a simple task and reguires much
effort. The inherent limitations of the models and the
representations of the human factors must be considered and
understood. Once all of this is done, incorporating human




The term, human factors, means many things to many
people. To the engineer interested in designing a man-
machine system, human factors may mean the average reach of
a person, the best place to position a computer display, or
the effects of lighting on the ability of a person to read
written information (Bailey, 1982) . To a psychologist, human
factors may suggest the person's intelligence or education,
his personality, or his ability to adjust to new
circumstances (Braun, 1979) . A sociologist may consider the
extent of the person's integration of cultural norms, his
ability to assume a role in a given situation, or the
influence of group expectations upon the individual's
behavior (Berger, 1975) . But what should human factors mean
to the combat modeler?
B. DEFINING HUMAN FACTORS - AN HISTORICAL APPROACH
Holmes (pg.,74) quotes S.A. Stouffer, who performed a
rigorous survey study of WW II, as saying that combat is
the end toward which all the manifold activities of the
Army are oriented, however indirectly, and he also quotes
(pg.,135) Ardant du Picq who called battle the final
objective of armies. To define human factors as they
pertain to combat modelers, historical data will be used to
examine the soldier in battle. For greater generality, the
focus will be on "common" soldiers in battle, while the
more singular examples of "great men" in history will be
excluded.
Before beginning, some advantages and disadvantages of
the historical approach should be discussed. One
disadvantage, particularly about events that are very old,
is the completeness of the data, or the lack thereof.
While this is not as much of a concern for recent events,
where newspapers and television have recorded, literally,
pounds of data, this is a potential shortcoming of ancient
history. In addition, since it is battle that will be
studied, the stories almost always are told by those that
lived. This may not be a representative sample.
However, since war is not conducted as an experiment to
observe the soldier, historical studies are valuable in
peacetime by supplying evidence otherwise not available
(Kellet,pg. , 11) . Certainly no experimental situation can
come close to approximating the realities of a battle, so
historical data are necessary. Jessup (pg.,6) states that
...history as the study of the past is the only
laboratory most social scientists have since they
cannot, like physical scientists, often set up
controlled experiments. They must gather their data
from a study of what has happened in given situations
in the past, and consequently they must use history.
Another disadvantage in the historical approach is
that history is necessarily told by a historian. There may
be bias in the selection of the facts available and their
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interpretation. There is always a possibility that an
historian may exclude certain facts that go against an
hypothesis. Also, some facts may suggest different
conclusions when examined in conjunction with other
different sets of facts. Additionally, the meaning of these
facts comes from the historians mindset which is a product
of culture and life experiences. A marxist may understand
an event as a result of the struggle of classes, while an
American versed in political science may interpret it as a
power struggle between political bases motivated by the
guest for profits.
It is true that one historian is necessarily selective
(Carr,pg. , 40) . The sheer number of facts available about
recent history requires that many will not be included,
while possibly all of the limited ancient historical facts
may fully be considered. However, Jessup (pg.,7) asserts
that in the pursuit of truth, modern historians share with
scientists the spirit of critical enquiry and utilize
scientific procedures and methods to gather reliable data.
Similarly, historical works that are blatantly biased or
grossly incorrect probably never survive the scrutiny of
the collective historical research community.
Finally, some may argue that history has a limited
value because today is nothing like yesterday. While this
is true in a strictly philosophical sense, it goes against
reality. Carr (pg.,85) agrees that history never truly
(emphasis added) repeats itself, but that to assert men
learn nothing from history is contradicted by a multitude
of observable facts. Similarly, though talking specifically
about combat operations in Viet Nam, the generality of
S.L.A. Marshall's (1969, pg. , 11) statements ring true:
I am well aware that the average American who has not
been to Viet Nam believes that the war there has
nothing in common with the North Koreans and Communist
Chinese, against the Japanese in World War II, or the
Germans in 1918. The military analyst who has worked
all these fields is far more impressed by the
identicalness of features, the similarity of problems,
the grinding repetition of historical incident.
Confident that history is a reliable resource, it does
not take very long to conclude that there are, in fact, a
small number of human factors in land battles that are
significant. It also does not take much reflection to
conclude that these factors are universal and assert
themselves in situations involving combatants other than
soldiers.
Proving this assertion, Holmes, Kellet, and Keegan
used extensive historical data, including a review of the
earliest written manuscripts to the latest after action
reports of the conflict in the Falkland Islands, as well as
anecdotes. Based upon these sources, the human factors of
war can be divided into two broad areas of influence upon
men: before/after the battle and during the battle.
C. BEFORE/AFTER THE BATTLE
The human factors that affect the soldier's behavior
and performance, before and after the battle, are wide
reaching in scope. Foremost, the influence of the soldier's
culture is a strong force in shaping the individual. This
basic force will interact with all other forces the
individual will encounter. Idealogy, another basic force,
also influences the person in many ways.
As a person transitions from civilian life in society
to the role of a soldier in the army, the factors of
training, unit esprit, and leadership impact upon that
person greatly. The new soldier certainly has to deal with
a different personal situation: the new surroundings, the
separation from loved ones, the fear. If all goes well, the
soldier and the unit will have a sense of high morale.
1 . Culture
Holmes (pg.,58) asserts that there is a wide
measure of agreement among psychiatrists that much of a
soldier's behavior in battle is accounted for by events in
the soldier's life that occurred long before ever joining
the army. Keegan (pg.,49) states that cultural norms
reflect deep seated habits and values that are important
parts in determining a soldier's behavior. One example of
these cultural components is religion.
The significance of religion can be observed today
in the war between the Soviet backed Afghans and the
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mudjahadeen who believe they are fighting a jihad, or "holy
war" . The recent removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
may be considered support for the assertion that size and
equipment is not all it takes to win a war.
This importance of religion is found throughout the
Mideast today in Iran, Palestine and elsewhere. In WW II,
the tenacity and fierceness of the Japanese is also
attributed to the influence of their religious beliefs
(Keegan, pg.,51). And some believe the strength of the
fighting Irish, now and in earlier wars, can be understood
in terms of the influence of their religious beliefs also
(Holmes, pg.,288).
2 . Ideology
Tied to the culture of the individual, but distinct
enough to consider separately, is ideology. The feelings of
patriotism, the perceived righteousness of the cause, or
belief and support of the political system, all offer
motivation to the soldier (Keegan, pg ., 49 ) . Holmes
(pg.,276) quotes John Dollard, who completed an extensive
study of the Spanish Civil War, as saying that ideology
functions before the battle to get the man in; and after
battle by blocking thoughts of escape. For many soldiers
"
. . . ideological motivations are likely to contribute more
to persistence than to elan" (Kellet,pg. , 327) , and Holmes
(pg.,277) notes that a survey in the Pacific (during WW II)
indicated that the higher the man's conviction about
America's war aims, the more likely he was to be willing to
fight on.
3 . Training
Training has many influences. Keegan (pg.,42)
believes that training is designed to inculcate group
cohesion and tactical and technical expertise. Holmes
(pp., 36-56) proposes the same ideas and discusses them at
length. Kellet (pg.,324) describes training as a
socialization process that is crucial to the soldier's
acquisition of reasonable preconceptions about battle and
that learning drills, such as "hitting the dirt", are
valuable in counteracting and controlling fear.
This notion of drills addresses one of the
important facets of training: discipline. As noted, the
rote discipline of reaction drills helps reduce fear and
instill confidence before battle by increasing the
soldier's perception of his competence. He can do the right
thing automatically. Drill also instills the habit of
obedience (Keegan
, pg. , 44 ) . Discipline functions to
increase the likelihood that a soldier will carry out the
tasks assigned to him by imposing sanctions on undesirable
behavior, and limiting the soldier's perceived range of




Unit Esprit, or esprit de corps, is at the heart of
success in action, so believed the distinguished 18th
century French theorist, Comte de Guilbert (Keegan,pg. , 46)
.
Holmes (pg.,50) echoes this, saying that it can produce
formidable battlefield performance. He describes in great
detail the effects of the esprit fostered by a unit's past
history and achievements, particularly as it is embodied in
the organization of the regiment (pp. , 307-315) . Kellet
(pp. , 321-322) feels that unit esprit helps to enlarge and
canalize the bonds established among individual soldiers
sharing a similar environment: their training, the war,
etc. Holmes agrees (pg.,293) that the roots of unit esprit
lie in the smallest of military groups, but that the "full




The effects of leadership before and after the
battle are mainly in its contribution to the soldier's
morale and confidence of being in a good unit. Holmes
(pg.,341) says that there certainly is a connection between
the individual soldier's motivation and confidence in the
upper echelons of the army's command structure. A survey of
officers with combat experience in Viet Nam (Marashian,
1979) revealed that the respondents overwhelmingly felt
that a soldier's faith in leaders directly affected
motivation to fight. Their experience was mostly at the
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lower levels of battalion and company. Kellet (pg.,327)
says of this level that well trained and experienced
officers and NCO's confer a sense of protection on their
subordinates.
One other important aspect of the influence of the
formal leadership is that they have access, or at least the
means, to acquire information. Kellet (pg.,326) notes that
decision and persuasion are central to leadership and that
the formal leadership controls the channels of information
which facilitates the ability to determine a course of
action and to convince others of its validity. Leadership
during battle, however, is quite different.
D. DURING THE BATTLE
The human factors described above are important to
consider when trying to understand the soldier and his
behavior in battle, even though their greatest influence is
before and after battle. Perhaps surprisingly, Holmes
(pg.,75) asserts that battle is not a frequent occurrence
of war, though it is easy to think that it is. He believes
(pg.,79), however, that to understand the soldier fully, we
must consider the context of the war, the factors described
above, and also those of battle, even if battle is such a
small, crucial part of war.
That battles are crucial cannot be overlooked. Battles
cause not only physical damage but they destroy morale.
Clausewitz believed that once the enemie's morale is beaten
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the war will be won (Howard, pg. , 44) . This is accomplished
by destroying the enemy's will to fight, hopefully at
once, but more often little by little, battle by battle.
The human factors described earlier are not enough for
a complete understanding. Battle is different than war.
Kellet (pg.,319) says that "one of the features of combat
is its absorbing immediacy." He continues and says that
motivations tend to become strongly situational and that
some, such as ideology, are temporarily replaced or recast.
The factors to be considered next are those most important
during battle: the individual soldier, the primary group,
leadership, and the immediate environment.
1. The Environment
The environment is not a part of human nature, but
it certainly affects all the other human factors. By
environment, the temperature, precipitation, amount of
light, and terrain are all included. Some effects of the
environment are to reduce morale if the soldier is cold, to
slow reactions in extreme heat, to reduce ability to see or
hear in rain or fog, and so on. On the other hand, if the
conditions are favorable, the effects of environment can be
synergistic in their improvement of a soldier's morale and
his performance. Certainly, a clear crisp day can be
uplifting, while fog and rain favor those occupying a well




Men, particularly in dangerous and high stress
situations, desire leadership so that their immediate needs
may be met and their anxieties allayed (Kellet,pg. , 32)
.
The "Fighter" study of the Korean war concluded that the
success or failure of the squad depended upon the leader
and what he was doing, noting that many men functioned
effectively only when they are in or near the presence of a
"stronger" person (Kellet,pg. , 15)
.
In dangerous circumstances, the power of example is
the strongest (Kellet,pg. , 32) . Holmes (pg.,341) asserts
that it is a fundamental truth that a military leader will
not succeed in battle unless prepared to lead from the
front. He goes on to show the unfortunate inherent
mortality of leaders, particularly at the lower levels. He
concludes that
... in the last analysis it is the determined and
charismatic leadership, and the selflessness and
dedication that it represents, that helps to pull men
through the rigours (sic) of battle. . .
.
3 . The Primary Group
Holmes (pg.,291) believes that the key to what
makes men fight is found in the small group and the bonds
that link men together. Kellet (pg.,320) thinks that in
combat, the small group sets standards of behavior largely
in terms of two primary goals: individual and group
survival, and task accomplishment, with the group survival
probably being the strongest. He continues, saying that the
14
standards are enforced by social pressure and that
. . .most soldiers are unwilling to take extraordinary
risks, but their self esteem and their membership in
the group require that their actions will not be judged
unworthy by their fellows.
Keegan (pg.,52) quotes S.L.A. Marshall as saying
that men are unwilling to appear cowards in the eyes of
their comrades and that "personal honor is the one thing
valued more than life by the majority of men." Marshall
(1947 ,pg. , 43) also said that all fighting men are the same,
that they are sustained by their fellows primarily, and
their weapons secondarily. Keegan concludes (pg.,321) that
there are two things that produce fighting spirit: the
small group of comrades that the soldier fights with and
the morale of the individual soldier himself.
4 . The Individual Soldier
The morale and capability of the individual soldier
is related in many ways to all of the factors discussed so
far. These interactions are complex and difficult to
determine. Toomepuu (pg.,6) concludes that the important
and useful determinants of soldier capabilities are the
same as those for civilians, namely mental aptitude,
educational attainment, literacy, social adjustment and
physical health and strength. The author feels that while
this may give an estimate as to whether a certain soldier
will do better assigned as a mechanic rather than a cook,
it does not help to say whether a given infantryman will be
a formidable fighter or a lackluster follower.
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There are other considerations about the individual
that are important. When has he last slept and for how
long? Is he hungry or thirsty? Is he well protected from
the environment or is soaking wet and chilled to the bone?
Is this his first combat experience or the end of his first
year? These are not just philanthropical questions.
Many of the answers to these questions will
certainly reflect contributions to the soldier's morale,
positive or negative. Few people at the mercy of the
elements, for example, maintain a pleasant disposition.
Besides morale, many of these issues also affect
performance (Hockey, 1983)
.
E. HUMAN FACTORS DEFINED
Using history, an extensive review of war and combat
has been made to elucidate the significant human factors.
These factors were split into two broad categories because
human factors can be considered to have their greatest
impact either during battle or before/after battle. The
factors belonging to the latter include leadership, unit
esprit, training, ideology, and culture. The factors
important during the battle include the soldier himself,
the primary group, leadership, and the environment.
Though leadership is found in both, different aspects
were covered and the difference was primarily in the level
of the army structure: the difference between leadership
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from the upper echelons, and, the leadership from those
that are in place or rise to the fore while "in the
trenches"
.
This classification of human factors into two
categories helps to simplify the inherent complexities and
helps to give some insight. However, the danger of over
simplification cannot be ignored. All of the human factors
discussed above are involved. Many interact with each
other. Some are predominant in certain situations, yet have
no effect in others. Even those that may dominate at one
time are not guaranteed to dominate again in very similar
circumstances
.
This is simply a reflection of the nature of man;
complex and intricate across many levels. The interactions
revolve around mans emotions, the ability to think, and the
circumstances of war and battle. Predicting human
performance in any situation requires an understanding of
the human, the activity , and the context in which it is
performed, but, even a good understanding of these elements
is not sufficient, for the interaction between them is also
critical (Bailey, pp. , 16-17) . Until all of this is
understood, combat modelers must make assumptions that are
reasonable and attempt to simplify the problem so that




Combat models used in computer simulations are a small
subset of models in general. A model is often defined as a
representation of a real system. A system is any set of
objects, processes, and the relationships between and among
them. A system could be an airplane in flight, including
the plane's structure, weight, and the physical laws of
aerodynamics; a product distribution company, including the
trucks, routes, warehouses, capacities, and demands for the
product; or the system could be the armed forces of a
country engaged in combat, including a myriad of things
ranging from weapons and logistics to communications and
human decision making.
A model of a system could be one of various forms that
often depend upon the system. One form the model could take
is an actual physical reproduction. Wind tunnels and scale
reductions of airplanes are used to model the airplane in
flight. New designs can be verified without building the
aircraft or risking the life of a pilot. This type of
model is usually called iconic (Markland,pg. , 6)
.
Another form the model could take is called symbolic or
mathematical (Emshof f ,pg. , 6) . In this form, the system is
represented by mathematical equations that represent the
objects, processes and relationships in the system. The
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example above of the product distribution system could be
represented as a linear program, a system of first-order
simultaneous equations, which can be solved mathematically
to optimize certain variables.
Finally, another form the model could take is that of a
computer simulation. In this form, the model represents
... a (system) in which the elements of the (system)
are represented by arithmetic and logical processes
that can be executed on a computer to predict the
dynamic properties (of the system)...
(Emshof f ,pg. , 10) .
A model of the armed forces of a nation engaged in battle
can use various kinds of mathematical equations to
represent the weapons and their effects, and it may use
logical constructs to represent various decision making
processes. These equations and constructs are written in a
computer language and the program is run on a computer.
A model seldom includes all of the components and
interactions of the real system; if it did, it might be
just as easy to study the original system! In many cases,
all of the processes and interactions of the system are not
known or understood, particularly if there are humans or
elements of chance involved. "Insignificant" aspects of
the system are eliminated and, invariably, "significant"
19
aspects are abstracted and simplified (Hartman,pg. , 1-2)
.
Whether a model is a valid representation of the real
system depends as much on the intended use of the model







Both of these aspects, purpose and structure, must be
considered.
B. PURPOSE OF COMBAT MODELS
Combat models are most often computer simulations, and
the purpose or use of these models may vary. To understand
a model, its purpose must be examined. In the Department of
Defense (DOD) , the purpose of a model can be grouped into
four broad categories, but this does not imply that one
model is not used for different purposes at different
times. These categories are technical evaluation, force
structure analysis, doctrinal analysis, and training
( Farmer, pg. , 10)
.
1. Technical Evaluation
Models in this category are often used in the
acquisition of new weapon systems. The model will include a
representation of the weapon system. Certain parameters of
the weapon system, such as probability of kill or mean
time between failure, is varied to evaluate tradeoffs
between competing design constraints or competing systems.
Other models in this category are often called engineering
models and are basically concerned with the physical laws
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of nature and the weapon system. For example, the flight
time of a rocket may be compared against various design
weights.
2 . Force Structure Analysis
Here, models are used to analyze tradeoffs in unit
size, organization, and weapon composition. The unit size
could vary from the lowest levels, the squad or crew, all
the way to corps and army. Investigating the organization
may look at including a new weapon system in the current
organization or establishing a separate organization
altogether. Also weapon composition could look at the





This category includes various sub-topics such as
tactical or strategic doctrine development, capability
analysis, and requirements analysis. In doctrinal
developments, the manner in which a unit employs weapons or
maneuvers may be varied. At a tactical level, for example,
an anti-aircraft weapon system may intentionally not be
used at maximum range but rather employed at a range that
insures visual identification of the aircraft first. The
effects of this doctrine could be evaluated in terms of
friendly and enemy aircraft losses and friendly ground
losses from enemy air strikes.
21
Capability analyses will use real world data such
as current doctrine, force levels, readiness, and resupply
constraints with different possible scenarios such as a
one-front war, and then a two-front war to assess the
ability of present forces to meet the threat. The focus
here is on current ability to meet hypothetical threats.
Requirements analysis is similar to force structure
analysis. However, a given task and threat is assumed,
such as deploying to a specific area in two days to stop an
invasion by an infantry division. The model will work
within the given constraints to determine the required
forces needed. Current forces are compared to the forces
required by the model and shortcomings can be expressed as
new requirements.
4. Training Models
Models to teach and train are used in many ways.
Many of these models are not computer simulations, but
many new ones are (Joint Analysis Directorate, 1986) . They
may be found in a command post exercise where decisions by
the commanders are fed into the model and the model
generates the results of those decisions using some
simulated battle. Likewise, a model could be used as a
driver for a larger exercise, helping to produce logistical
requirements or difficulties. The size and scope, as well
as the level of these models, can vary tremendously.
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In summary then, some models may be used at
different times for different purposes, but they are
usually built with a single purpose in mind. Besides
purpose, combat models can be differentiated by their
structure. Not all models will fit neatly into any
categorization, but the following is comprehensive enough
to highlight the major differences.
C. THE STRUCTURE OF COMBAT MODELS
The structure of a combat model is usually quite
complex. Additionally, a given model may incorporate a
number of distinct features that a classification scheme is
bound to consider as exclusive or opposite. Examples will
be noted later. A complete and very thorough taxonomy of
combat models, specifically for "warfare simulations", can
be found at Anderson et. al. They propose three functional
areas as the key to making a taxonomy: purpose,
construction, and qualities. Purpose has been discussed
above.
While the Anderson taxonomy is too detailed to be
considered in its entirety here, the significant
differences of a model's structure, that is, its
construction and its qualities, have been combined and will
be discussed. These significant differences focus on the
manner in which the model treats time and probability, the
level of aggregation, the scope, the processes represented,
and the aspects of the environment considered.
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1. Treatment of Time
A model usually treats time in one of two ways:
dynamically or statically. In a static time treatment, time
is not considered explicitly. There are no equations that
have a time variable. On the other hand, if the model is
dynamic, it has an explicit representation of the passage
of time and it has equations that have a time variable
(Anderson, pg. , 10) . If time is considered at single
instants as required in the model, or at a specified
interval, the model is also called discrete. If the model
represents time as a continuously changing variable, and
other variables can change at any time, the model is called
continuous (Hartman,pg. , 1-5)
.
2. Treatment of Probability
A model is often classified as stochastic or
deterministic. Deterministic models do not invoke any
random numbers to pick a value from a distribution of
values for a variable. It may use variables that have
values thought of as having a distribution, but a single
point estimate is used. A deterministic model is given the
required inputs, the equations in the model are solved,
and the answers are given. A stochastic model, on the other
hand, explicitly represents the probabilistic nature of
certain events or processes and is fashioned accordingly.




Aggregation reflects the level of detail in a
model. If the model explicitly considers individual weapon
systems, such as a tank or rifle, then the model is said to
have a high resolution. If the model considers as the
smallest entity, a combination of lesser elements, such as
considering a company as a force, but not considering the
individual weapons that are found in that company, then the
model is called aggregated. The level of aggregation,
indicated by the smallest entity represented, depends upon
the model and can vary within the model as well.
4 . Scope
The scope of a model refers to the level of the
highest elements engaged in the model, the geographical
area, types of forces, and types of weapons. In land combat
models, the levels mirror the levels of the current force
structure from squad to theater. In fact, the model is
often referred to by its level: for example, "a division
level model". The geographical area can range from a few
square kilometers to a world-wide conflict. The types of
forces represented could be those of a single service,
combined arms operation, joint operations, or the model
may focus on a single component such as artillery or
submarines.
In addition, the "sidededness" , or way the model
treats the opposing forces actions and capabilities, could
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be considered here (Anderson, pg. ,A-13) . The weapons in the
model are related to the forces represented, but often the
model will exclude certain weapons such as nuclear,




The processes in a model affect the entities. The
entities are the objects of the system represented by the
model, whether they be high resolution or highly
aggregated. Attrition, target acquisition, communications,
and movement are examples of processes. Models include
different processes, and there are different methods for
mathematically representing those processes (Anderson,
pg.,8). Attrition, for example, can be represented by
various kinds of Lanchesterian equations (Farmer, pg. , 23)
(Institute for Defense Analysis, 1975) , a shot-by-shot
analysis (Farmer, pg. , 20) , or, the method of firepower
scores (Farmer, pg. , 58) (Stockfish, 1975) . Often the method
used to represent the process is determined by the level of
aggregation in the model.
6. Environment
The environment in a model includes the terrain,
foliage, weather, temperature, light of day or darkness of
night, and other details such as cities or bodies of water.
Most newer models have very sophisticated and complete
terrain representations. These representations are used,
for example, to compute line of sight from firer to target
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or target visibility, and mobility of vehicles. The
representation of other parts of the environment will vary
from model to model, and the detail of those
representations also varies.
D. SUMMARY
Major differences between models allow a categorization
scheme to be proposed. These main differences are found in
the model's purpose and in its construction. No taxonomy,
however, can be simple and complete at the same time. There
are many models used by the DOD today. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff publishes a catalog of models used by the DOD, and
the 1986 edition describes over 600 of them (Joint Analysis
Directorate, 1986)
.
While the description and comparison of combat models
is not always very simple, a few generalizations can be
noted. First, many models may include facets of the
categories above in different parts of the same model. A
brigade level model may consider individual tanks using a
stochastic shot-by-shot analysis of the tank engagements,
but aggregate field artillery tubes to the battery level
and use a deterministic force-on-force evaluation of
artillery and counter-artillery fire. Then the model is
used at one time to assess tactics of new weapon system
(Gallagher, 1988) , and at another time to assess its own
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value as a model of training exercises (Ingber, 1989) .
One such model is JANUS. (Joint Analysis Directorate,
pg. ,J-31)
.
Another generalization within the possibilities and
exceptions noted is that large forces, or high level
models, tend to be highly aggregated and use deterministic
eguations, while lower levels, or small forces, have high
resolution (little or no aggregation) and use stochastic
methods. In fact, many models that fit into the latter
category are often used to "feed" data to models in the
former and were built for that purpose.
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IV. INCORPORATING HUMAN FACTORS INTO COMBAT MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
If human factors are to be incorporated into combat
models, then both must be considered. The human factor and
its relation to combat must be understood. It must be an
important factor that significantly influences combat, and
there must be verifiable data to support the modeler as
attempts to specify the mathematical representation of this
factor and its relation to other variables are made.
Since models are so different and complex, the factor
cannot be added simply as an afterthought. A specific model
must be chosen, and its inner workings and assumptions must
be thoroughly understood, as well as its relationship to
other models, if any. The mathematical representations of
the processes must be well understood so the factor may be
appropriately modeled and incorporated.
This all presupposes that human factors should, indeed,
be included. The first step, then, is to insure that this
supposition is correct.
B. TO HUMAN FACTOR OR NOT...
The decision to incorporate human factors must be based
upon an examination and evaluation of the arguments for and
against doing so. This decision will be limited by the
ability to incorporate human factors, and the costs to do
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so should not exceed the benefits. The costs and benefits,
of course, are not measured in simple monetary terms alone.
The full range of benefits and opportunity costs should be
considered. These considerations and the arguments for and
against incorporating human factors into combat models will
be examined below.
Some of the reasons for including human factors, or as
it is often thought of, including more realism in combat
models are the following: more realism in models will
provide improved model results and, therefore, better input
for the decision makers; as a means of studying war and
combat, more realism in models allows a better
understanding of those organizations and organizing ideas;
and, finally, it is the next logical step in modeling
methodology to remove assumptions or insert the
"insignificant" aspects ignored earlier, accounting for
them explicitly.
Some common arguments against including human factors
are as follows. If human factors are included on one side,
then they must be included on the other, and the
hypothetical net effect in the model is a cancellation— it
is not necessary. Another argument is that the reality of
war and combat can not be truly simulated, so what good is
a little more realism when the model will never come close
anyway— why bother at all. Finally, another argument
asserts that human factors are extremely complex, there is
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no real understanding of them, nor is there sufficient
valid data to use to model the factors— it can not be
done.
1. All Opposed
One counter to the "why bother" is the simple fact
that incremental improvements are the foundation of
modeling methodology. This is an iterative process (U.S.
Army Soldier Support Center Report DABT58-81-C-0139 ,pg. , 21)
(Emshof f ,pg. ,57) (Markland,pg. , 7) . Surely no modeler would
argue that models will ever truly simulate combat. That is
part of the definition of a model: a representation of
reality. Combat models attempt to describe the phenomena of
war and battle, they do not try to prescribe some set of
rules for conducting war and battle. Thus, one goal in the
model is to have as good a representation of reality as
possible.
The argument that "it does not matter" requires a
little investigation to determine that, while on the
surface the argument is appealing, it does not withstand
scrutiny (Van Nostrand,pg.
, 13) . First of all, human
factors are dependent upon cultural influences. Certainly,
many opposing forces will have different cultural origins.
If, on the other hand, the cultures are very similar, the
organization of the forces are often different. Human
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factors are affected by the organization of the forces
because this directly influences the organization of the
primary groups.
Similar arguments apply to the tactics, doctrine,
and leadership of the different sides. The human factors to
be included in a model are not simply additive or
multiplicative constants that are the same for both sides.
Finally, Miller and Bonder (U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Report
571, pg. , 6) concluded, after reviewing nine models and 112
combat processes, that
...a general (emphasis added) improvement in the
treatment of human factors in combat models would be
likely to have a large and unpredictable effect on
simulated battle results.
The final argument against incorporating human
factors into combat models, that "it can not be done" has
some substance. Meister (pg.,141) says that it is cliche to
say that a model is only as good as its data, but the
great weakness of models is the lack of appropriate data
with which to exercise them. He notes that no one performs
research solely to secure data for model purposes. However,
the situation is not hopeless.
Van Nostrand (pg.,2) also notes that there is no
single source of human performance data that could be
accessed directly for modeling purposes, but she does cite
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various data sources that could be consulted. The data may
have to be screened and judiciously selected, but some
does exist.
2. All in Favor
Having considered the arguments against
incorporating human factors into combat models, consider
the arguments in favor. That to include human factors is
the next logical step in the modeling methodology has been
discussed. This certainly is a valid reason, and from a
purely academic standpoint is reason enough.
Continuing along an academic perspective, the
potential for greater knowledge and understanding of war,
combat, and organizational perspectives is too great to
miss and should be pursued. The application of any
knowledge gained in these areas from attempting to
incorporate human factors into combat models promises
benefits and improvements to current doctrine and
organization that would not be purely academic.
If doctrine and organizations are better understood
and the military reformed to be more effective, then
deterrence would be enhanced by the presentation to
enemies of a more formidable force and cost reductions
would result from increased efficiency. Likewise, if war
erupts because deterrence fails, any increased knowledge of
war and combat gained earlier would have a direct influence
upon national survival.
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Finally, the first argument in favor mentioned
above, providing better information for the decision maker,
is the most important, with great implications. Many of
these decision makers are at the highest levels in the DOD.
Their decisions about hardware acguisitions, force
structures, and doctrine all impact the way our nation's
resources are committed. Anyone familiar with the dollar
amounts associated with these decisions and the DOD budget
should not find it hard to conceive of large savings from
improved decisions made by these decision makers. The
savings associated with better decisions regarding our
nation's defensive strength and preparedness are difficult
to assess, and may only amount to increased confidence that
the right decision was made, but the potential benefits
from improved decision making can not be ignored.
3 . Motion Carried
This somewhat lengthy discussion was not in vain.
Before deciding how to do something, the more important
question to answer is whether this something need be done
at all. The author feels that arguments against
incorporating human factors are weak, except for comments
on the scarcity of data available right now, and that the
range and significance of opportunity costs associated with
not incorporating human factors make it imperative that
this be attempted.
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Confident that human factors should be incorporated
into combat models, attention now turns to how to
accomplish this. The focus will be on how to pick which
human factors to incorporate into which models. Obviously,
both will influence and interact with the choice of each
other. Ideally, both are considered simultaneously, but
for clarity, they will be discussed separately.
C. PICKING THE RIGHT MODEL
The choice of models in which to include human factors
will influence the choice of human factors to be included.
These limitations are imposed by the model's purpose and
structure. The structure will favor or preclude certain
factors, as will the purpose.
1. Limitations Imposed by the Structure
The structure is important because it may preclude
certain factors from ever being considered. Consider in a
model the treatment of time. If the model uses discrete
events and the factor has an explicit, continuous time
dependence, then including it a may pose a problem. For
example, if the human factor being considered is how a
soldier maintains a picture of crosshairs on an enemy tank
to guide a tube launched anti-tank missile, and this
factor varies significantly with time over a few hundred
milliseconds, then a model that considers time in discrete
intervals of one minute can not consider this factor.
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Consider a stochastic model. Human factor
representations derived from an expected value or average
value possibly may be used readily in a deterministic model
that requires only a point estimate, but they can not be
included in a stochastic model that requires a known
distribution of values from which to randomly select one.
Finally, consider a model that has high
resolution. Human factor representations based upon data
that were recorded for a company or battalion evaluation,
for example, will be difficult to include into a model that
explicitly considers individual weapons and crews.
In addition to the structural aspects above, other
aspects of the model structure, the scope and environment,
must be considered. Obviously, and perhaps most
importantly, if the model deals with opposing forces, the
equivalent (not equal) factors must be derived and included
for the opposing forces. Otherwise, the results of the
model may be extremely difficult to understand in relation
to what the model does and does not include. Did Red win
because it is better, or because that side of the model has
more assumptions built in, does not consider the human, and
is, therefore, more efficient and likely to win?
On the other hand, if the model's structure
accounts for weather, day or night, and other environmental
conditions, then the modeler has an opportunity to include
those factors which have a dependence on them. In this
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case, the structure of the model has offered greater
possibilities for the modeler to consider rather than
impose limitations.
2. Considering the Model's Purpose
In addition to the model structure, the model's
purpose may favor or preclude certain human factors. If the
model is used to evaluate tradeoffs based upon the laws of
physics, such as weight versus flight time in a technical
evaluation or engineering model, then the infusion of human
factors may not be required nor desired.
An interesting problem is presented if the model is
specifically used to feed data to other models (General
Research Corporation, 1973) . Human factors included in one
may eliminate the need in the other. The factors will have
been fully accounted for in the first. The possibility of
"counting twice" must be guarded against and prevented
(U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency Report SR-8 6-3 4,
pg.,3-1). This inter-relationship of models, and
specifically which models are included in these kinds of
relationships, must be known. Then an evaluation must be
made to decide which model should be changed, if any of
them will be.
If the model is used for training purposes, then
perhaps the modeler has the most freedom. In these
circumstances, the human factor representations may not
need as strict a tie to quantitative data as in other
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models. For example, the vagaries of war may be modeled
from historical data, and a commander and his staff in a
war game suddenly may be faced with the possible mishaps
that accompany the "fog of war". Their simple movement
order was "misunderstood" and one of their units is
reported crossing the river at the wrong location! What do
they do now? The possibilities for valuable training are
very great.
In conclusion then, given a model, or once a model is
chosen, the modeler must become intimately familiar with
both the purpose and structure of the model to determine
any limitations to, or opportunities for incorporating
human factors. Some models may already include a small
measure of human factors, but care must be exercised before
accepting even those. Burton and others (Lawrence Livermore
Report UCID-2 1551, unnumbered page in the introduction)
noted, after an extensive review of combat models that
...several models did incorporate human performance
assumptions which were found to be incongruent with
real world data about how people behave under various
environmental conditions and both physical and
cognitive stress.
D. PICKING THE HUMAN FACTOR
The human factors that will be modeled by mathematical
representations in a combat model are limited by the
validity and availability of the data required to construct
these representations. This is so because the need for a
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quantitative link to reality is paramount in mathematical
modeling to solidly establish the soundness of the model.
This requirement forges the weakest link in the whole
chain of incorporating human factors into combat models.
Currently, there is some data available for a few human
factors such as the effects of heat or sleep loss. For
other factors related to specific task performances and
small group behaviors, current efforts seem promising in
providing the necessary data in the next five to ten years.
Unfortunately, there are some factors such as individual
decision making in combat that seem as if they will not be
quantified for quite some time. And in all of these, the
validity of the data might be challenged, because none of
it is derived from "an experimental war", the true
laboratory setting for combat.
1. What We Have Now
Most of the human factors for which there is some
data available now focus on the individual soldier. The
notion of sleep loss has been of interest, particularly
since the Army has been contemplating continuous operations
as the norm in future battles (Van Nostrand, 1988) (National
Health Research Center Report 8 6-2 2,198 6) (U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Report 505,1981) (U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences Report 80-4a,1979) (U.S.
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
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Sciences Report 386,1979). Some data, such as the minimum
required amount of sleep to prevent performance
degradation, is still under contention. Not surprisingly,
none of the researchers seem to have agreed upon a
mathematical formulation for incorporation into models.
The effects of stress and fatigue on the individual
have been investigated quite extensively in the laboratory
(Hockey , 1983 ) (U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences Report 79-A14, 1979) . Methods
for simulating combat stress are now being investigated
and if successful, the data will probably be more readily
accepted (U.S. Army Health Services Command Report 8 6-
003,1986). Some of the stressors examined have been heat,
cold, noise, vibration, ambient light levels, and dangerous
environments. However, except for a general notion of an
inverted " U " shaped curve in performance versus stress
(or arousal) , there is no consensus among investigators
about a specific mathematical formulation.
An individual's performance in heat, specifically
when clothed in chemical weapon protective gear (Mission
Oriented Protective Posture-MOPP) does, however, seem to
have some consensus. At least the data were derived from
the somewhat more realistic settings of actual soldiers
performing the required tasks of different jobs with and
without the MOPP gear, though some jobs such as tank crews
were noticeably absent (U.S. Army Material Systems
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Analysis Activity Report 313,1981). More recent work
intends to address this shortcoming (U.S. Army Health
Services Command Report 86-003
,
pp. , 152 , 203)
.
Other studies have been done on relatively stable
characteristics of the individual such as the influence of
culture or national characteristics and education and
aptitude on performance. Many of these studies have seldom
gone much further than to conclude that there is a
statistical significance worthy of attention (U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Report 708,1986) (U.S. Army Soldier Support Center Report
ACN-64024 , 1981) . Two have proposed some quantification of
national characteristics: one mentions Soviet studies (Van
Nostrand, pg . , 8) and the other draws on extensive
historical data analysis (Dupuy, 1979)
.
Perhaps a summary for the data available today is
this: there is some data available, there is generally no
consensus, and overall, its usefulness for combat modeling
is dubious at best. However, this is not cause to cease
activity. Incremental improvements are better than none.
Meister (pg.,141) states that modelmakers are avid in
collecting whatever data are already available. In doing
so, emphasis must be placed on carefully screening and
comparing the data to insure it is appropriate.
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2 . What is Coming
Some recent developments in the manner of gathering
data foster hope for the future. In the laboratory the use
of surrogate measures, easily measured parameters that
have a known relationship to those parameters under
investigation, and the use of computers to conduct the data
gathering, is being proposed (Kennedy, 1987) . For other
studies the setting is no longer a sterile laboratory
environment. In one case, SIMNET, it is a fairly realistic
interactive simulation network and in the others, such as
the National Training Center, live exercises are conducted
with fairly good simulated weapons effects and non-
intrusive recording of data. As stated by Link and Shapiro
(pg.,10), the premise is
...that human factors effects are most easily and
accurately (measured) ... by human involvement in roles
as nearly identical to those assumed in actual
combat ....
The most recent development, SIMNET, is an
interactive, distributed simulation network that provides
real time graphics of battle scenarios (Radgowski, 1989)
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Report 6929,1988).
Current usage consists of realistic fighting vehicle mock-
ups, ground and air, "operated" by real soldiers. When they
look outside, they see the "planet SIMNET". Each view is
different depending upon the vehicle's "actual" position.
Thus, for example, the tank in the middle can see the tanks
42
to his left and right, while the left most tank sees
terrain to his left and his fellow tank on the right.
The soldiers must perform the actual tasks of
driving or flying, acquiring targets, loading, firing,
communicating with each other, etc. The mock-ups provide
noise, simulate the feeling of movement and when a weapon
is fired, for example, the computer checks the aim, speed
of the vehicle, and other pertinent factors, displays a
round going down range, a hit or miss, and any retaliatory
shots by the "enemy". The computer can record various
parameters for real time analysis or save the data for
later analysis.
The potential here is enormous! Very strict testing
standards can be imposed to obtain accurate, realistic data
on numerous human factors. Various demographic variables
can be measured, the soldier's training level and unit
morale can be measured or estimated, fatigue or sleep loss
could be induced, and then performance in target
acquisition, firing times, loading times, or perhaps even
tactical decision making, can be recorded and analyzed.
The use of non-intrusive television and audio
recordings together with weapons simulated by using lasers
(Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System— MILES) are
being used at the National Training Center (NTC)
(Ingber, 1989) (Buck, 1987) (Furman, 1982) . A battalion faces
a highly trained unit that operates under Soviet tactics.
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The action is as real as any exercise can get; certainly
better that a laboratory. Here again the potential is
great. However, the NTC has had some problems because of
its size and the amount of equipment necessary to record
all of the action (Government Accounting Office Report
NSAID-86-130,1985)
.
A paper published in 1979 discussed the Small Force
Engagement Range-SFER (Link, 1979). In the SFER, the focus
is on a platoon or two that is ambushed while providing
security for a vehicle transporting nuclear weapons. The
scenario could be manipulated and various human factors
such as the influence of the primary group, leadership,
and, perhaps individual decision making, could be linked
to psychological variables measured before and after the
event, and situational circumstances contrived to occur in
the scenario. Unfortunately, an extensive search found
nothing more published about the SFER since the original
paper.
While the potential of all of these methods is
great, it will not be maximized unless there is a
structured, coordinated, and adequately funded program to
develop and implement the necessary data gathering and
analysis efforts specifically for combat models. An ad hoc
approach by various, unrelated organizations could result
in the same state of affairs that exists with the scant
data available today.
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3 . Off in the Future
Some of the important human factors still are only
vaguely understood and experiments are being conducted to
verify basic theories. The influences of culture or
ideology on behavior (Berger, 1975) (Braun, 1979) , defining
and measuring morale or unit esprit (U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Report
617), the intricacies of organizational structures
(Pennings, 1986) , and most importantly, the all pervasive,
human decision making (Arkes,1986) (Estes,1980) all fall
into this category.
Interesting methods to attempt to model human
decision making are using artificial intelligence
techniques. Artificial intelligence uses unique computer
languages and attempts to simulate human decision making,
defining hueristics or rules that search codified human
knowledge (Rowe ,1988)
.
The RAND Corporation has been working on adapting
and extending the artificial intelligence techniques of
production rules, scripts, goal-directed search, and
pattern recognition (Davis, 1984 ,pg. , iii) (Davis, 1982) . They
have built an automated war game of the strategic and
operational levels with modules that represent Red, Blue,
and third world country behavior using expert system,
rule-based, logic. Experts from various fields were
assembled to describe a country's behavior given various
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circumstances. These behaviors are captured in if-then
logic statements that examine the "environment" and then
decide on a behavior choice (Hall ,pg. , 4) . The modules do
not program behavior in the sense that the same behavior is
always executed, but the behavior is very rich and diverse,
depending upon the combination of many factors and
occurrences within the wargame.
O'Keefe and Phelps have written recently on the
subject of combining artificial intelligence techniques
with operations research techniques (Phelps , 1986)
(O'Keefe, 1985) . Phelps (pg.,14) feels that
... for the efficient solution of complex problems, a
combination of approaches is called for: objective
models for those parts of the system capable of
mathematical description, together with human-style
heuristic reasoning for the more complex and behavioral
parts.
One of the behavioral parts, human decision making,
could be investigated and simulated by the development of
expert systems. The rules could account for the various
phenomena of cognitive and psychological biases such as
framing or recency, and satisficing versus optimality, so
important in influencing an individuals ultimate decision.
Certainly progress is being made in these areas,
but the possibility for data and usable mathematical
formulations in the near future is unlikely. The author
feels that much of an individuals thinking, small group
behaviors, and other psychological and sociological aspects
of combat models must use these techniques to achieve
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representation in combat models and the search for "hard
data" in these areas might have to be abandoned.
Indeed, artificial intelligence techniques and
expert systems should be combined with different types of
combat models and sensitivity analyses of the models to
these human factors should be conducted. The results of
these analyses will guide the refinement and future
development of these methods, help to validate this
approach to incorporating human factors, improve combat
models by adding more realism, and indicate to
experimentalists which areas should be given priority for
efforts to obtain hard data, if at all possible, in the
years ahead.
E. COMBINING THE TWO
Regardless of the specific combat model and human
factor to be incorporated within it, certain precautions
and constraints must be considered. One usefulness of
models is their simplification of reality. If all human
factors were incorporated, it may be that the model is
realistic but so complex that any attempts by "outside"
people to understand it are bewildering, if not impossible.
Perhaps even the modelers that made it so complex may find
it difficult to explain the model to someone else, find and
correct a software glitch, or make minor adjustments to try
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novel ideas in the future. Davis (1982 ,pg. , 15) believes
this also, and says that
... an attempt to treat all . . . (human factors) at all
times would immediately prove both impossible and
undesirable— it would merely clutter the landscape
with noise.
Likewise, models are useful if they can be run numerous
times so that different variations of input data or
conditions may be tested and the output analyzed. This is
the foundation of simulation models. If the model is so
complex, causing the input of data or changing of
parameters to become extremely tedious, or if the run time
of the model on the computer is very long, timely analysis
and the model itself is in jeopardy.
Preventing unacceptable complexity and run times
requires that caution be exercised when deciding which
human factors to incorporate. A decision to include only
the most significant human factors as determined by
historical analysis and empirical performance degradation
data is this author's recommended approach.
Another approach requires a detailed analysis of the
model of interest to determine what factors affect the
model the most. For example, in the areas of fatigue and
sleep loss, including these factors will result in
degrading the performance presently modeled. Some general
models of this effect, say a flat curve to a breakpoint
followed by a negative exponential, would reveal whether
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this factor is significant or not with regard to some
measure of battle results such as loss ratios.
The author feels that this sensitivity analysis will
account for idiosyncracies of various model structures, but
that it is not necessarily a reflection of reality. A
model's structure may be sensitive to a human factor that
is determined to be insignificant by historical or
empirical methods. Likewise, human factors judged to be
significant by historical and empirical methods may prove
to be insignificant in a particular model because of its
specific structure formulation. Ideally, both approaches
should be used to zero in on the factors to be included.
The constraint against building a totally new model
often exists and this requires that the human factor
mathematical representations and the ones in the model
already, be compatible. Van Nostrand (U.S. Army Concepts
Analysis Agency, pg. , 1-6) suggests that human factors type
computations be performed in a separate logical computer
module, and the results of these computations (pergorithms
or personnel algorithms) be represented by the addition of
a single variable to the set of variables that describe the
entities in the model. The notion of post processing and
pre-processing of data is also mentioned as an alternative




Attempts to incorporate human factors into combat
models must be made. Obviously, this is not a simple task
of just combining two things together. Detailed
understanding of the model's purpose and structure is
required, as well as a determination of the significant
human factors in combat and in the model
.
These factors, whenever possible, must have data to
support the mathematical representations, and these
representations must be compatible with the model. The
factors involving decision making and other psychological
and sociological aspects of man should be modeled with
artificial intelligence techniques until hard data is
obtained. The changed model must still be usable in terms
of its complexity and run time.
It is the combination of this process of incorporating
human factors into combat models and analyzing the results
of realistic models that will prove the most beneficial to
increasing man's understanding of war and battle.
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V. CONCLUSION
One of man's endeavors to understand war is through the
use of combat models. These models attempt to represent
reality and yet still be simple enough to help provide
valuable insight into the true nature of war. War is a
human venture, and therefore combat models must account
for man. Human factors must be incorporated into combat
models.
The significant human factors that affect battle should
be determined by examining the historical data of war and
combat. This examination reveals that human factors fall
into two categories based upon when they affect man the
most: before/after the battle and during the battle.
Culture, ideology, training, unit esprit, and leadership
are the human factors strongest before/after the battle.
During the battle, they are the environment, leadership,
the individual, and the primary group. The last two are the
most important.
Before human factors can be incorporated into combat
models, the model must be well understood. This includes
the model's purpose and its structure. The purpose is one
of four types: technical evaluation, force structure
analysis, doctrinal analysis, and training. The structure
is often quite complex. The structure includes the
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treatments of time and probability, the level of
aggregation, the scope, the processes, and the environment
represented.
Once this has all been done, the two can be combined.
Simple to say, hard to do. The model and the human factors
must simultaneously be considered, because the selection of
one influences the selection of the other. The structure
and purpose of the model may limit which human factors can
be considered. Analysis of the model's sensitivity to human
factor representations will indicate which human factors
are significant in that model. Likewise, not all human
factors are mathematically representable at the current
time. Some human factors, such as decision making, can be
included in models using artificial intelligence
techniques until the data are obtained, if possible. When
the two are combined, the model must still be usable and
understandable
.
There is much work to be done. The basic thrust is
trying to understand man. In some areas the concepts are
understood and some data is available. In others, the basic
theory is still being debated. Step by step, improvements
to combat models in the area of human factors must be made.
In the end, the degree and validity of human factor
representations in combat models is nothing less than a
mirror of the understanding of man himself.
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